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Trade costs are a crucial in new economic geography (NEG) models. The unavailability of 
actual trade costs data requires the approximation of trade costs. Most NEG studies do not 
deal with the ramifications of the particular trade costs specification used. This paper shows 
that the specification of trade costs matters. Estimations of a NEG wage equation for a sample 
of 80 countries show how the relevance of the key NEG variable, market access, depends 
upon the trade costs specification. Our conclusion is that NEG needs to (re-)examine the 
sensitivity of its empirical findings to the handling of trade costs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Trade costs are a key element of new economic geography models in determining the 
spatial distribution of economic activity (see e.g. Krugman, 1991; Venables, 1996 and 
Puga, 1999): without trade costs there is no role for geography in NEG models. It is 
therefore not surprising that trade costs are also an important ingredient of empirical 
studies in NEG (see e.g. Redding and Venables, 2004; Hanson, 2005 or Head and 
Mayer, 2004). They are a vital ingredient of a region’s or country’s (real) market 
potential, that measures the ease of access to other markets (Redding and Venables, 
2004; Head and Mayer, 2006). In the empirical trade literature at large, trade costs are 
also a main determinant of the amount of trade between countries (see e.g. Limao and 
Venables, 2001; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). 
The empirical specification of trade costs is, however, far from 
straightforward
1. Problems with the measurement of trade costs arise because trade 
costs between any pair of countries are very hard to quantify. Trade costs most likely 
consist of various subcomponents that potentially interact, overlap and/or supplement 
each other. Obvious candidates are transport costs, tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs), but also less tangible costs arising from cross-border trade due to e.g. 
institutional and language differences have been incorporated in previous studies 
(Limao and Venables, 2001). An additional difficulty arises with what is arguably the 
most obvious measure of trade costs, transport costs. Accurate transport cost data 
between country pairs are very difficult to obtain and even completely unavailable 
when considering transport costs between regions
2. In principle, between-country 
transport costs can be inferred from cif/fob ratios. The IMF provides for instance 
extensive trade data on the basis of which these cif/fob ratios can be calculated, see 
e.g. Limao and Venables (2001) and Baier and Bergstrand (2001). However as put 
forward by Hummels (1999, p.26) these data “suffer from severe quality problems 
and broad inferences on these numbers may be unwarranted”
3.  
                                                 
1 The specification of trade costs may also be not that straightforward from a theoretical point of view, 
see McCann (2005) and  Fingleton and McCann (2007). 
2 Where actual transport cost data are used in the empirical literature the coverage in terms of the 
number of country pairs is very limited (e.g. costs of shipping a standard 40-foot container from 
Baltimore (USA) to 64 different countries in Limao and Venables, 2001) or only the evolution of 
average (by world-region) transport costs over time is available (e.g. Norwegian and German shipping 
indices and air cargo rates in Hummels, 1999). 
3 Hummels infers transport costs by making use of more accurate data, but these data are only available 
for very few countries.   3
The problems of measuring trade costs that beset the empirical trade literature 
also apply to empirical studies into the relevance of NEG since any attempt to shed 
light on the empirical relevance of NEG calls for the availability of bilateral trade 
costs between a sufficiently large number of countries or regions (e.g. Redding and 
Venables, 2004; Hanson, 2005; Brakman et al., 2006; Knaap, 2006). Given the 
unavailability of a direct measurement of bilateral trade costs, all NEG studies turn to 
the indirect measurement of trade costs. In doing so, they closely follow the empirical 
trade literature (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004 for a very good survey of the 
latter) and assume a so-called trade cost function. This trade cost function aims to 
proxy the unobservable trade costs by combining information on observable trade cost 
proxies such as distance, common language, tariffs, adjacency, etc with assumptions 
about the unobservable trade cost component. The assumptions made about this trade 
cost function, e.g. functional form, parameter hetero- or homogeneity across country 
pairs, which observable cost proxies to include or how to estimate each cost proxy’s 
effect, all potentially have a (crucial) effect on the results of any empirical study.  
In the empirical NEG literature, the measurement of trade costs is only a 
means to an end, and as a result the relevance of the preferred trade costs specification 
for the conclusions with respect to the NEG hypotheses under consideration is 
typically ignored. Virtually all studies just pick a trade cost specification and do not 
(or only marginally) address the question as to the sensitivity of their results to their 
chosen approximation of trade costs. This paper aims to overcome this lack of 
attention by systematically estimating and comparing trade cost functions that have 
been used in the empirical NEG literature. We use various trade cost functions to 
estimate a standard NEG wage equation for 80 countries and look into the importance 
of the trade costs specification for the relevance of market access, the central NEG 
variable when it comes to inter-regional spatial interdependencies, as a determinant in 
the difference in gdp per capita between countries. It turns out that the way trade costs 
are proxied has substantial effects when it comes to the conclusions about the 
relevance of market access. Trade costs matter not only in terms of the size (and 
sometimes also the significance) of the market access effect, but also in terms of the 
spatial reach of economic shocks. The upshot of our paper is that the empirical 
specification of trade costs really matters for the conclusions reached with respect to 
the empirical relevance of NEG models.   4
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we first introduce the 
basic NEG model with a focus on the equilibrium wage equation and the role of trade 
costs. Next we discuss the two estimation strategies that have been used in the 
literature to estimate the wage equation, both of which require the specification of a 
trade cost function. Section 3 discusses the main conceptual difficulties involved in 
the approximation of trade costs by specifying a trade cost function. Given these 
difficulties, section 4 introduces a third way to approximate trade costs, which does 
not require a trade cost function but instead infers bilateral trade costs directly from 
bilateral trade data. Section 5 introduces our data set. In section 6 we present our 
estimation results for the NEG wage equation, hereby focussing in detail on the 
impact of the choice of trade cost approximation used and estimation strategies on the 
key explanatory NEG variable, market access. It turns out that the relevance of market 
access, or in other words of spatial interdependencies between countries, depends 
strongly on the choice of trade cost approximation. Section 7 concludes.            
 
2. TRADE COSTS AND THE WAGE EQUATION IN NEG 
The need to have a measure of trade costs when doing empirical work on NEG 
models immediately becomes clear when discussing the basic NEG model on which  
the empirical studies are based (e.g. Redding and Venables, 2004; Knaap, 2006; 
Brakman et al., 2006; Hanson, 2005). This section first develops the theory behind the 
widely used wage equation that serves as the vehicle for our empirical research too 
(e.g. Krugman, 1991; Venables, 1996 and Puga, 1999). Our exposition is largely 
based on the seminal paper by Redding and Venables (2004)
4. In the second part of 
this section, we move from theory to empirics by introducing the two different 
estimation strategies that have to date been used to estimate the parameters of the 
NEG wage equation (see Head and Mayer, 2004), focussin explicitly on the 
specification of trade costs. 
                                                 
4 See their paper, or Puga (1999) and Fujita et al. (1999) ch.14, for more details on these types of 
models.   5
2.1 The basic NEG model 
Assume the world consists of i = 1,...,R countries, each home to an agricultural and a 
manufacturing sector
5. In the manufacturing sector; firms operate under internal 
increasing returns to scale, represented by a fixed input requirement ciF and a 
marginal input requirement ci. Each firm produces a different variety of the same 
good under monopolistic competition using the same Cobb-Douglas technology 
combining three different inputs. The first is an internationally immobile primary 
factor (labour), with price wi and input share β, the second is an internationally mobile 
primary factor with price vi and input share γ and the third is a composite intermediate 
good with price Gi and input share α, where α + γ + β = 1.  
Manufacturing firms sell their variety to all countries and this involves 
shipping the goods to foreign markets. This is where the trade costs come in, these are 
assumed to be of the iceberg-kind and the same for each variety produced, i.e. in order 
to deliver a quantity xij(z) of variety z produced in country i to country j, xij(z)Tij has to 
be shipped from country i. A proportion (Tij-1) of output ‘is paid’ as trade costs (note 
that Tij = 1 if trade is costless). Note that this relatively simple iceberg specification 
(introduced mainly for ease of modelling purposes) does not specify in any way what 
trade costs are composed of. It is precisely the need to specify Tij more explicitly in 
empirical research, see below, that motivated our paper. Taking these shipping costs 
into account gives the following profit function for each firm in country i, 
() () / [ () ]
RR
ii j i j i j i i i i i j
jj
p zx z T GwvcF x z
αβ γ π =− + ∑∑     (1) 
 where pij(z) is the price of a variety produced in country i. 
Turning to the demand side, each firm’s product is both a final (consumption) 
and an intermediate (production) good. It is assumed that these products enter both 
utility and production in the form of a CES-aggregator with σ the elasticity of 
substitution between each pair of product varieties. Given this CES-assumption about 
both consumption and intermediate production, it follows directly that in equilibrium 
all product varieties produced in country i are demanded by country j in the same 
quantity (for this reason varieties are no longer explicitly indexed by (z)). Denoting 
country j’s expenditure on manufacturing goods (coming from both firms and 
                                                 
5 In the theoretical exposition, countries are used as the geographical unit of interest. Instead of 
countries we could have taken any other geographical level of aggregation, e.g. regions, cities, districts, 
counties, or provinces.   6
consumers) as Ej, country j’s demand for each product variety produced in country i 
can be shown to be (following utility maximization and cost minimization on behalf 
of consumers and producers respectively), 
(1 )
ij ij j j xp E G
σσ −− =           ( 2 )  
where Gj is the price index for manufacturing varieties that follows from the assumed 
CES-structure of both consumer and producer demand for manufacturing varieties. It 













⎣⎦ ∑         ( 3 )  
Maximization of profits (1) combined with demand as specified in (2) gives the well-
known result in the NEG literature that firms set the same f.o.b. price depending only 
on the location of production, pi (so that price differences between countries of a good 
produced in country i only arise from differences in trade costs, i.e. pij = piTij), where 
pi is a constant markup over marginal costs: 
  /( 1) ii i i i pG w v c
αβ γσσ =−        ( 4 )  
Next, free entry and exit drive (maximized) profits to zero, which pinpoints 
equilibrium output per firm at  (1 ) x F σ = − . Finally combining this equilibrium 
output with equilibrium price (4) and equilibrium demand (2), and noting that in 
equilibrium the price of the internationally mobile primary factor of production will 
be the same across countries (vi = v for all i), gives the equilibrium wage of the 
composite factor of immobile production, i.e. labour, 
1
/1 / ( 1 ) ( 1 )
R
ii i j j i j
j
wA G c E GT
βσ
αβ β σ σ −− −− ⎛⎞
= ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑      (5) 
where
1/ 1
/1 / (1 ) / Av F
β σ





is a constant. 
Equation (5) is the wage equation that is at the heart of those empirical studies in 
NEG that try to establish whether, as equation (5) indicates, there is a spatial wage 
structure with wages being higher in economic centers (e.g. Brakman et al., 2006; 
Knaap, 2006; Redding and Venables, 2004; Mion, 2004 and Hanson, 2005). More 
precisely, the wage equation (5) says that the wage level a country is able to pay its 
manufacturing workers is a function of that country’s technology, ci, the price index   7
of manufactures in that country, Gi, and so called real market access, the sum of trade 
cost weighted market capacities
6.  
Note that trade costs play a crucial role in (5), most visibly in the real market 













⎣⎦ ∑        ( 6 )  
Wages are relatively higher in countries that have easier access to consumer markets 
in other countries when selling their products and that have easier access to products 
produced in other countries (producer markets). The lower trade costs, the easier 
access to both producer and consumer markets abroad, the higher wages firms can 
offer to workers. Trade costs are thus of vital importance in determining the spatial 
distribution of income.  
We now turn to the discussion of the two different ways by which the wage 
equation has been estimated in the literature so far. Hereby particularly emphasizing 
the way in which trade costs are dealt with. 
 
2.2 Estimating the wage equation 
Taking logs on both sides of (5) gives the following non-linear equation that can be 
estimated: 
(1 )( 1)
12 3 ln ln ln
R
ii j j i j i
j
wGE G T
σσ α αα η
−− ⎛⎞
=+ + + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑    (7) 
where ηi captures the technological differences, ci, between countries that typically 
consists of both variables that are correlated (modelled by including e.g. measures of 
physical geography or institutional quality) and/or variables that are uncorrelated 
(modeled by an i.i.d. lognormal disturbance term) with market and supplier access. 
The α’s are the estimated parameters from which in principle the structural NEG 
parameters can be inferred. There are basically two different ways in which wage 
equation (7) has been estimated in the empirical NEG literature.  
 
                                                 
6 The actual wage equation estimated may differ slightly from the one presented here in each particular 
empirical study, but the basic idea behind it is always the same, i.e. with wage depending on real 
market access and the price index of manufactures, which to a very large extent depend on the level of 
trade costs between a country (or region) and all other countries (regions).   8
2.2.1 Direct non-linear estimation of the wage equation 
The first empirical strategy to estimate the wage equation was introduced by Hanson 
(2005) and can be discussed rather briefly. It involves direct non-linear estimation of 
the wage equation (7). Authors that have subsequently followed this direct non-linear 
estimation strategy include Brakman et al. (2004; 2006), and Mion (2004)
7.  
To deal with the unavailability of directly measurable trade costs, all papers in 
the “Hanson”-tradition assume a trade cost function to deal with the need to specify 
Tij for empirical research (see the next section)
8. What is important here is that this 
trade cost function is subsequently directly substituted for Tij in (7). Its parameters are 
jointly estimated along with the parameters of the wage equation. This is rather 
different from the second estimation strategy. 
 
2.2.2 Two-step linear estimation of the wage equation making use of trade data 
The second strategy comes from the work by Redding and Venables (2004) and 
involves a two-step procedure where in the first step the information contained in 
(international) trade data is used to provide estimates of so-called market and supplier 
capacity and bilateral trade costs that are subsequently used in the second step to 
estimate the parameters of the wage equation. Other papers using this strategy include 
inter alia Knaap (2006), Breinlich (2006), Head and Mayer (2006) and Hering and 
Poncet (2006). 
  Instead of directly estimating (7), this estimation strategy makes use of the 
following definition of bilateral trade flows between countries that follows directly 
from aggregating the demand from consumers in country j for a good produced in 
country i (2) over all firms producing in country i: 
 
11 1
ij i i ij i i ij j j EXn p xn p T E G
σσ σ −− − ==       ( 8 )  
                                                 
7 The first version of this paper was already available as an NBER working paper (nr.6429) in February 
1998. This explains why others have used his methodology and have published their work earlier than 
Hanson himself. 
8 Besides information on trade costs, Tij, also the data on the price index, Gi, is unavailable at the 
regional level. Very briefly, the problems with the lack of data on regional price indices are solved by 
either using, besides the wage equation, other (long run) equilibrium conditions
8 (Hanson, 2005; 
Brakman et al., 2004 and Mion, 2006) or by assuming away the use of intermediates in manufacturing 
production (α = 0) and approximating each region’s price index by the average wage level in the 
economic centers that are closest to that region (Hanson, 2005 Brakman et al., 2006), see also Head and 
Mayer, 2004, p. 2624. 
   9




σ − , of the exporting country that is the product of the number of firms 
and their price competitiveness, the ‘market capacity’, 
1
jj EG
σ −  of the importing 
country and the magnitude of bilateral trade costs  ij T  between the two countries. 
Taking logs on both sides of (8) and replacing market and supply capacity by an 
importer and exporter dummy respectively, i.e. 
1
ii i sn p
σ − = and 
1
jj j mE G
σ − = , results in 
the following equation that is estimated: 
 ln ln (1 )ln ln ij i ij j ij EX s T m σ ε =+ − + +       ( 9 )  
where εij is an i.i.d. lognormal disturbance term.  
  In the second step, the estimated country specific importer and exporter 
dummies and the predicted value of bilateral trade costs that result from the estimation 
of (9) are then used to construct so-called market and supplier access. These are 
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The predicted values of market and supplier access are subsequently used to estimate 
the wage equation, i.e. rewriting (5), using (6) and (10) and taking logs on both sides 
gives: 
  12 3 ln ln ln ii i i wa S AM A α αη =+ + +       ( 1 1 )  
where ηi, α1 and α3 are as specified in (7) and a2 captures a somewhat different 
combination of structural parameters than α2 in (7).  
  The problem of the unavailability of a direct measurement of trade costs when 
using this estimation strategy enters in the first step. All papers solve this problem by 
assuming a trade cost function (see next section). The parameters of this trade cost 
function are jointly estimated with the importer and exporter dummies and 
subsequently used in the construction of the predicted values of market and supplier 
access. As opposed to the direct estimation of the wage equation, the parameters of 
the distance function are thus not jointly estimated with the parameters of the NEG 
wage equation.    10
The motivation for Redding and Venables (2004) to use this 2-step strategy, is 
that “this approach has the advantage of capturing relevant country characteristics that 
are not directly observable but are nevertheless revealed through trade performance” 
(Redding and Venables, 2004, p. 75). Still, they have to assume an empirical 
specification for the trade cost function, and moreover the country dummies may be 
capturing ‘too much’ relevant country characteristics (see section 3 for more detail). 
In section 4 we, following Head and Ries (2001), will take the idea that actual trade 
data can be used as a foundation for market and supplier access in the wage equation 
one step further by letting trade data determine the total trade costs thereby 
circumventing the need to explicitly specify the trade function Tij. But before doing 
so, we first discuss the main important assumptions, often implicitly made, that are 
involved when one approximates Tij by making use of a trade cost function.  
 
3.  THE TRADE COST FUNCTION 
All papers using either the direct or two-step estimation strategy deal with the 
unavailability of a direct measure of trade costs by specifying a trade cost function. In 
its most general form the trade cost function is: 
(,,,) ij ij j i ij Tf X X X υ =       ( 1 2 )  
The trade costs involved in shipping goods from country i to country j are a function f 
of cost factors that are specific to the importer or the exporter (Xj and Xi respectively), 
such as infrastructure, institutional setup or geographical features of a country (access 
to the sea, mountainness), bilateral cost factors related to the actual journey from j to 
i, Xij, such as transport costs, tariffs, sharing a common border, language barriers, 
membership of a free trade union, etc, and unobservable factors, υij. Given the afore 
mentioned unavailability of transport cost data between a sufficient number of 
countries, these are in turn also proxied by most notably bilateral distance, but 
sometimes also actual travel times or population weighted distance are used. 
The trade cost function that is used in estimating the wage equation in NEG 
studies, is typically chosen on the basis of the ‘older’ empirical literature on 
international trade, more specifically on the estimation of the so-called gravity 
equation of which (9) is an example (see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for an 
extensive discussion of the gravity equation). Usually, and probably mostly for ease   11












=∏∏        ( 1 3 )  
where the unobservable part, υij, of the trade cost function is modelled by a  
disturbance term (that is usually assumed to be i.i.d.). To give an idea about the type 
of trade cost function used in the NEG wage equation studies, Table 1 below shows 
the trade cost function used in several NEG papers including Hanson (2005) and 
Redding and Venables (2004).  
 
Table 1  Trade cost functions used in the empirical literature 
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Notes: Dij denotes a measure of distance, usually great-circle distance, but sometimes also other 
measures such as travel times (e.g. Brakman et al., 2004) or population weighted great-circle distance 
(e.g. Breinlich, 2006) have been used. Bij denotes a border dummy, either capturing the (alleged 
positive) effect of two countries/regions being adjacent (e.g. Redding and Venables, 2004; Knaap, 
2006) or the (possibly country-specific) effect of crossing a national border (e.g. Breinlich, 2006; 
Hering and Poncet, 2006). 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the trade cost function imposed differs quite a bit 
between these papers and between the 2 estimation strategies. Or, to quote Anderson   12
and van Wincoop (2004): “A variety of ad hoc trade cost functions have been used to 
relate the unobservable cost to observable variables (p.706)” and “Gravity theory 
(read: new economic geography theory) has used arbitrary assumptions regarding 
functional form of the trade cost function, the list of variables, and regularity 
conditions (p.710, phrase in italics added)”. To a large extent based on Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2004), our discussion of the (implicit) assumptions underlying the use 
of a trade cost function concerns six issues: i) functional form, ii) variables included, 
iii) regularity conditions, iv) modelling costs involved with internal-trade, v) the 
unobservable component of trade costs, vi) estimating the trade cost function’s 
parameters.  
i) functional form. All papers in Table 1 have to assume a specific functional 
form for the trade cost function. As can be seen from Table 1, empirical papers in 
NEG opt for a functional form as shown in (13); all cost factors enter multiplicatively. 
As in the international trade literature (see Hummels, 2001), the main reason for doing 
so is probably ease of estimation. Although being by far the most common functional 
form used in the empirical NEG and the international trade literature, its implications 
are usually not given much attention. As pointed out by Hummels (2001), the 
multiplicative form implies that the marginal effect of a change in one of the trade 
cost components depends on the magnitude of all the other cost factors included in the 
trade cost function. As this may not be that realistic he argues that a more sensible 
trade cost function combines the different cost factors additively, i.e. 
() 12
MK
ij m ij k i k j ij
mk
TX X X γ γγ υ =+ + + ∑∑      ( 1 4 )  
where Xij, Xi, Xj and υij are defined as in (12). Using this specification avoids the 
above-mentioned problem, as each cost factor’s marginal effect does no longer 
depend on the magnitude of the other cost factors. In estimating the wage equation in 
section 6, we will therefore use both a multiplicative and additive trade cost function 
and check whether this makes a real difference or not.  
  Also the specific distance funtion chosen is of concern. Some papers take an 
exponential distance function (Hanson, 2005; Brakman et al., 2004 and Mion, 2004), 
hereby following the theoretical NEG literature (e.g. Fujita et al., 1999 and Krugman, 
1995). The other papers shown in Table 1 opt for the power function instead, which is 
also the standard choice in the empirical trade literature. As argued by Fingleton and 
McCann (2007) the latter function has the virtue of allowing for economies of   13
distances
9, so that transport costs are concave in distance (standard in the 
transportation and logistics literature, see e.g. McCann, 2001), whereas the 
exponential distance function implies that transport costs are convex in distance. It 
also implicitly imposes a very strong distance decay, which may not be wanted (see 
Head and Mayer, 2004). 
ii) variables included. The number and composition of variables included in 
the trade cost function differs quite substantially across the papers in Table 1. The 
papers employing the direct estimation strategy only include distance in the trade cost 
function. The impact of assuming a more elaborate trade cost function when applying 
the direct estimation strategy is shown in section 6. Studies employing the two-step 
estimation strategy usually also take other bilateral trade cost proxies into account 
besides distance, see the variables Lij and Bij in Table 1, capturing the effect of 
language similarity and the border effect respectively.
10  
When it comes to the inclusion of potentially relevant variables capturing 
country-specific trade costs, a drawback of the second estimation strategy as outlined 
in section 2 is that the inclusion of the importer and exporter dummies (recall 
equations (9) and (10)) wipes out all importer specific and exporter specific variation 
so that the effect of country-specific trade cost proxies cannot be estimated. As a 
result, the constructed market (supplier) access term (10) includes only the exporter 
(importer) specific trade costs and misses those trade costs specific to the importer 
(exporter)
11. Implicitly all the papers using the two-step estimation strategy cum 
dummies approach mentioned in Table 1 assume that country-specific trade costs are 
zero. Redding and Venables (2004, pp.76-77) take note of this by also estimating the 
trade equation (9) without capturing the market and supplier capacity terms by 
importer and exporter dummies but by using importer and exporter GDP instead, 
                                                 
9 When the estimated distance parameter has to be between zero and minus one. 
10 Even though these papers include some more variables in the trade cost function, many additional 
variables have been shown to be of importance in the empirical trade literature. Examples are tariffs, 
colonial ties, quality of infrastructure, degree of openness, being member of a common currency union, 
the World Trade Organization or some preferential trade agreement (NAFTA, EU, Mercosur) and 
many more (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). 
11 The estimated exporter/importer dummy would in this case also pick up the exporter/importer 
specific trade costs so that market and supplier access would implicitly look like (in case of a 
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Note that MAi and SAj fails to capture the trade costs specific to country j and country i respectively.    14
hereby allowing for a more elaborate trade cost function. We will do the same in our 
estimations.    
  Besides the above discussion on which variables to include, also the way to 
measure a certain included variable differs between papers. The best example is the 
distance variable that shows up in all the assumed trade cost functions. Usually this is 
measured as great-circle distance between capital cities (e.g. Redding and Venables, 
2004), but others have used great-circle distance between countries’/regions’ largest 
commercial centres or counties’/regions’ centroids, population weighted distances 
(e.g. Breinlich, 2006) or travel times (e.g. Brakman et al., 2004). It is difficult to give 
a definitive answer to what measure of distance to include and the same applies for 
other variables (e.g. the border dummy, proxies of infrastructure quality). However, 
we think two recommendations can be made.  
Regarding the general question which variables to include; the appropriateness 
of the inclusion of a certain variable can (and should) always be tested by assessing its 
significance. Second, one should be careful with the inclusion of variables that are 
very likely endogenous. Examples are travel times, population weighted distance 
measures, quality of infrastructure, institutional setup or even being member of a free 
trade union. Especially when estimating the parameters of the NEG wage equation, 
that is itself already (by construction) plagued by endogeneity issues, adding more 
endogeneity through the trade cost function should in our view be avoided (or 
properly addressed but this is usually not so easy). The use of proxy variables such as 
great-circle distance, border and language variables and countries’ geographical 
features such as having direct access to the sea, that can more confidently be 
considered to be exogenous, should be preferred. 
  iii) regularity conditions. All papers in Table 1, implicitly or explicitly, make 
assumptions about the extent to which the impact of each variable included in the 
trade cost function is allowed to be different for different (pairs of) countries. Most 
papers assume that the effect of distance, sharing a common border or trading 
internationally on trade costs is the same for all countries or regions included in the 
sample. It is however likely that there exists some heterogeneity in the effect of 
different cost factors (see e.g. Limao and Venables, 2001). Some authors do allow 
these effects to differ between countries or regions (e.g. Breinlich, 2006 and Hering 
and Poncet, 2006) but usually do so by imposing ad hoc assumptions regarding the   15
way they are allowed to differ
12. An advantage of the assumption(s) made about the 
regularity conditions (compared to e.g. assumptions about functional form) is that 
they can be tested. This has so far not been done, we argue that this should receive 
some more attention. 
  iv) internal trade costs. The modeling of the costs associated with within-
country trade is another “problematic” feature in the empirical NEG papers
13. The 
need to incorporate some measure of internal trade costs follows directly from the 
functional form of the wage equation (5). There it is the sum of trade cost weighted 








≠ ∑ but also of domestic real market access, 
(1 )( 1)
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σ σ −− , which is a measure of own market capacity weighted by internal trade 
cost. Theoretically these internal trade costs are usually set to zero (Tii, = 1). In 
contrast, all empirical NEG papers proxy the internal trade cost by using an internal 
trade cost function that solely depends on so-called internal distance, Dii, excluding 
other country specific factors that could influence internal trade costs (see Redding 
and Venables, 2004, p. 62). More formally: 
 () ii ii Tf D = , where almost exclusively ()
1/2 2/3 / ii i Da r e a π =  (15) 
This often-used specification of Dii reflects the average distance from the center of a 
circular disk with areai to any point on the disk (assuming these points are uniformly 
distributed on the disk). Basically own trade costs are simply a function of a country’s 
or region’s area, the larger the country or region, the higher the internal trade costs. 
Also most papers, regardless of estimation strategy, do not allow internal distance to 
have a different effect than bilateral distance (an exception are Redding and Venables 
(2004), who make the ad hoc assumption that the internal distance parameter is half 
that of the bilateral distance parameter). In section 6 we explicitly estimate a different 
parameter on internal and bilateral trade and allow own trade costs to depend on other 
factors that simply internal distance. This and the use of own trade data gives us some 
indication into the (un)importance of explicitly modelling internal trade costs. 
                                                 
12 Note that assuming the effect to be the same for all countries/regions is also an ad hoc assumption. 
13 Some empirical papers in the international trade literature also deal with this issue (e.g.  Helliwell 
and Verdier, 2001) focussing largely on how to measure interal distances, but in general internal trade 
costs are not dealt with in this literature due to the fact that internal-trade statistics are hard to obtain.   16
v) the unobservable component of trade costs. In the direct estimation strategy 
this component is ignored, thereby implicitly positing that the assumed trade cost 
function is the actual trade cost function (Breinlich, 2006, also notes this). Taking 
account of the unobserved component using this strategy is not straightforward. Even 
if the unobservable component is assumed to be of the simplest kind, i.e. distributed 
i.i.d. and uncorrelated with any other compenent of either the trade cost function or 
the wage equation, the non-linear fashion in which it enters the wage equation makes 
it difficult to determine the appropriateness of the inference on the structural 
parameters when simply assuming it away (or equivalently assuming it is nicely 
incorporated into the error component of the wage equation itself). Simulation based 
inference methods could (and maybe should) be a way to shed more light on this 
issue.  
When using the two-step estimation strategy the unobserved trade cost 
component(s) is (are) more explicitly taken into account. They are usually assumed to 
be uncorrelated with the other (observable) trade cost components and to be 
independent draws from a lognormal distribution, so that they can be incorporated as 
a (possibly heteroscedastic) normal error term in the first step estimation of the 
gravity equation (9). Next the use of bootstrapped standard errors in the 2
nd step 
estimation aims to take account of the fact that the market and supplier access terms 
(constructed on the basis of the estimated parameters of the first step) implicitly 
contain the unobservable trade cost component as well, i.e. they are both generated 
regressors. 
 vi) estimating the trade cost function’s parameters and dealing with zero 
trade flows. This is only an issue when using the two-step estimation strategy, where, 
as explained in section 2, the parameters of the trade cost function are estimated in the 
first step by making use of a gravity-type equation. A well-known problem with the 
estimation of gravity equations is the presence of a substantial number of bilateral 
trade flows that are zero (i.e. countries not trading bilaterally at all). To deal with this 
different estimation strategies have been put forward. These can be grouped into two 
categories, i.e those estimating the loglinearized trade equation (9) and those 
estimating the non-linear trade equation (8). Because taking logs of the zero trade 
flows is problematic, the loglinearized version of the trade equation (9) is usually 
estimated using OLS and the non-zero trade flows only, or, by first adding 1 (or e.g. 
the smallest non-zero trade flow) to all or only the zero trade flows, and subsequently   17
estimating the trade cost function’s parameters by OLS or Tobit. When estimating the 
non-linear trade equation (8) instead, either NLS (Coe et al., 2002) or the recently 
proposed Poison pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator (Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006) can be used, in this case all trade flows can be used (the zero trade 
flows can now also be used as there is no need to take logs). 
Arbitrarily adding 1 (or some other positive number) to trade flows in order to 
be able to take logs of all (also the zero) trade flows is in our view highly 
unsatisfactory. The subsequent results obtained depend quite strongly on the actual 
amount that is added to the zero trade flows. Using the non-linear techniques solves 
this issue and can therefore be considered as a preferred way to estimate the trade 
function’s parameters. This is why we opt for the estimation of the non-linear trade 
equation (8) using the PPML estimator. 
To summarize, Table 2 lists the issues that one has to face when 
approximating trade costs by a trade cost function, while also providing possible ways 
to deal with these issues.  
 
Table 2  Trade cost functions and the two estimation strategies 
    Ability do deal with issue raised 
issue (possible)  solution  Two-step  Direct 







test the assumptions  +  + 
variable         
inclusion 
significance of 
inclusion can be tested
+ - 
(difficulty with exporter 
/importer specific trade 










include more than 
simply area 
+ -  





most hidden issue, 









(non-zero trade flows) 
+  
(NLS should do the job, 
given the other 
assumptions) 
Notes : + and – indicates the abilitity of the corresponding estimation strategy to deal with the issue 
raised w.r.t. to the choice of trade cost function that is used (compared to the other strategy).   
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4.  A THIRD ESTIMATION STRATEGY: IMPLIED TRADE COSTS 
Now that we have, at some length, discussed the (implicit) choices one has to make 
when using a trade cost function to approximate trade costs, Tij, in this section we 
introduce a third option where the need to specify a trade cost function does not arise. 
This is based on Head and Ries (2001) who provide a clever way to infer trade costs. 
Using the trade equation (8) and making two important assumptions (see below), they 








− ≡=          ( 1 6 )  
where EXij denotes imports of country j from country i and EXii denotes the total 
amount of goods consumed in country i that is also produced in country i. Moreover 
φij is introduced for notational convenience as a measure of the so-called ‘free-ness’ 
of trade (see Baldwin et al., 2003). It ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning prohibitive 
and 1 meaning completely free trade. Head and Ries (2001) use this method to 
construct implied trade costs for bilateral trade (disaggregated at the industry level) 
between the US and Canada. They show the gradual decline in trade costs over time 
and use regression methods to decompose it into a tariff and a non-tariff barrier 
component. Other papers that have also used (16) to construct implied trade costs are 
Head and Mayer (2004) and Brakman et al. (2006), they subsequently use them as a 
comparison to the theoretical breakpoints following from NEG models or, as Head 
and Ries (2001) do, to follow their evolution over time. 
We argue that (16) can also be used in the estimation of the wage equation. 
Instead of proxying trade costs by making use of a trade cost function, resulting in the 
(implicit) assumptions summarized by Table 2, implied trade costs provide an 
alternative estimation strategy. But the use of implied trade costs (unfortunately) also 
has its problems.  First, there is the additional data requirement. As can be readily 
seen from (16) the construction of implied trade costs requires the availability of trade 
with oneself, EXii, for all countries in the data set. Own-trade data are usually not 
readily available, but when both total export and production data are available they 
can be constructed as total a country’s or region’s own production minus exports (see 
e.g. Head and Mayer, 2004; Head and Ries, 2001; Hering and Poncet, 2006). It is only 
in the complete absence of bilateral trade data, as is typically the case when working   19
with data at the regional level (e.g. in the case of Europe, see Breinlich, 2006) that 
implied trade costs can not be used at all. 
  Secondly, and turning to the implicit assumptions made when constructing 
implied trade costs using (16), two assumptions are needed in order for the implied 
trade cost approach to work.  They follow directly from the way these implied trade 
costs are calculated. Substituting (8) for both bilateral and internal trade, we arrive at 
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That is to say, (A) internal trade costs are negligible and (B) trade costs involved when 
shipping from country i to country j are the same as shipping from country j to 
country i. Whether these assumptions are valid is an empirical matter to which we 
return in section 6 when discussing our estimation results. How do these two 
assumptions relate to the assumptions made when a trade cost function is used 
instead? Table 3 shows this on the basis of the six issues that were already discussed 
in section 2, with assumptions (A) and (B) in bold in Table 3. 
 
Table 3  Trade cost function vs. implied trade costs 
issue  Trade cost function  Implied trade costs 
functional form 
 
assumed  not an issue 
regularity conditions  ad hoc assumptions  
are (implicitly) made 
symmetry of bilateral trade 
costs 
variable         
inclusion 
many candidates, 
which ones to include? 
not an issue 
variable 
measurement 
no consensus,  
choices need to be made 
not an issue 
internal trade cost  assumed to depend on internal 
distance 
assumed to be negligible 
unobservable 
component 
needs explicit care  
(additional assumptions) 
implicitly taken into account 
estimating the 
parameters 
choice of estimation method  
not always straightforward 
not necessary 
 
The potential advantage of using implied trade costs clearly comes to the fore. But 
this verdict, of course, depends on the alleged innocence of assumptions (A) and (B).   20
As to the assumption of symmetric bilateral trade costs, this assumption is also quite 
common in the empirical NEG studies that use a trade cost function. All the papers 
mentioned in Table 1 use a trade cost function that (implicitly) assumes symmetric 
bilateral trade costs (the only exception being the second trade cost specification from 
Redding and Venables, 2004 in Table 1). Arguably the most problematic assumption 
when using implied trade costs is the assumption of negligible internal trade costs. 
Although virtually all theoretical results in NEG are established while using this 
assumption, many authors (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2005; Head and Mayer, 
2004) have stressed the importance of dropping this assumption when doing empirical 
work. But given the other above-mentioned virtues of using implied trade costs, 
combined with the fact that theoretically these internal trade costs are also usually 
absent, we argue that they should be considered as a “third way” to deal with trade 
costs in empirical NEG studies. 
  The remainder of our paper deals with the impact of using different ways to 
proxy trade costs when estimating the NEG wage equation using either the direct or 
two-step estimation strategy. Hereby we focus in particular on the way conclusions 
about real market access, a key NEG variable, may differ when using different 
methods to proxy trade costs. 
 
5. DATA 
Our empirical results are based on a sample of 97 countries (see Appendix A for a 
complete list of these countries) for the year 1996. In order to be able to estimate the 
wage equation, we have collected data on gdp, gdp per capita (as wage data is not 
available for all countries in our sample, we follow Redding and Venables (2004) and 
use gdp per capita as a proxy) and the price index of gdp (as a proxy for Gi in (7)
14) 
from the Penn World Tables. We also need data to calculate the various trade cost 
proxies. To this end, we have collected data on bilateral distances, contiguity, 
common language, and indicators of a country being landlocked, an island nation, or a 
Sub-Saharan African country. All these variables are chosen because of their 
exogeneity (at least in terms of reverse causality). Complementing these data, we also 
need trade data to be able to calculate implied trade costs and to be able to infer the 
trade cost function’s parameter(s) when using the two-step estimation strategy. These 
                                                 
14 Note that theoretically the price index should only refer to that of tradable goods. Using the overall 
price index as a proxy does also capture the price of nontradables.   21
we have collected from the Trade and Production 1976-1999 database provided by 
the French institute CEPII
15, which enables the use of both bilateral trade and internal 
trade data for most of the countries in our sample.   
   
6. ESTIMATION RESULTS: TRADE COSTS AND MARKET ACCESS   
In line with the discussion so far, we discuss our results in two stages. First, we focus 
on inferring trade cost proxies from bilateral trade data. We estimate the parameters of 
the trade cost function and illustrate how the results differ when using different trade 
cost functions. We also calculate implied trade costs and check how much of these 
implied trade costs can be explained by a particular trade cost function. In the process 
we look into some evidence regarding the relevance of the assumptions made when 
using implied trade costs as a proxy for Tij (recall assumptions 18A and 18B from 
section 4). Subsequently, we turn to our main point of interest, i.e. the way in which a 
particular trade cost approximation affects conclusions about the relevance of real 
market access in determining gdp per capita. This is done by estimating the wage 
equation using the different trade cost proxies, and by comparing the size and 
significance of the parameter on market access (α3) in equation (11) for each of the 
trade cost proxies used. Moreover, we look for our main trade costs specifications at 
the spatial reach of economic shocks to market access by simulating the effects of a 
5% gdp shock in Belgium on gdp per capita in other countries. In this way, we can 
gauge the importance of varying the trade costs specifications for the relevance of 
spatial interdependencies, the backbone of the NEG literature. 
  Besides implied trade costs, we distinguish between 4 different types of trade 
cost functions, Table 4 shows these four trade cost functions. The first two trade cost 
functions are chosen as they are the ones used by the two papers that respectively 
introduced the two-step and direct estimation strategy, Redding and Venables (2004, 
RV) and Hanson (2005). The multiplicative function is chosen as it allows trade costs 
to depend not only on bilateral variables but also on importer/exporter specific trade 
cost factors, more specifically those associated with being landlocked (llock), being 
an island nation (isl) and being a Sub-Saharan African country (ssa). As mentioned 
before, such a multiplicative function is quite common in the empirical trade literature 
(see e.g. Limao and Venables, 2001).  
                                                 
15 http://www.cepii.org/anglaisgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm   22
 
Table 4  Trade cost functions used 
Abbreviation trade  cost  function 
RV  exp( ) ij ij ij TD B
δ α =  
Hanson  exp( ) ij ij TD τ =  
multiplicative 
12 1 2
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exp( )exp(
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See also Table 1 for the definition of the variables. 
 
The additive function is picked to address the critique (Hummels, 2001) on the use of 
a multiplicative trade function. We also allow for the distance parameter to be 
different for bilateral and internal distance, hereby estimating (instead of imposing) 
the different impact of distance when considering intra- vs international trade. 
Estimating instead of assuming the coefficient on internal distance should in our view 
be preferred compared to making ad hoc assumptions about it. 
 
6.1 Inferring trade costs from trade flows 
6.1.1 Inferring the trade cost function’s parameters from trade flows 
To infer the trade cost function’s parameters from bilateral (and internal) trade flows 
we estimate equation (8) by using the PPML estimation strategy
16. This estimation 
strategy is, see section 3, able to take account of the zero trade flows in a way that 
(contrary to NLS) also deals with the heteroscedasticity that is inherently present in 
trade flow data (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Being able to deal with the 
zero trade flows without having to impose additional (arbitrary) assumptions, gives 
the PPML method an advantage over the heavily used Tobit and/or OLS methods. 
Table 5 shows our estimation results. 
To allow for the more elaborate multiplicative and additive trade cost 
functions we (following Redding and Venables, 2004, p. 76, see their equation (22)) 
substituted the importer and exporter dummies with importer and exporter gdp
17. In 
                                                 
16 Except for the additive specification, where we, due to the inability of the PPML method to readily 
perform non-linear poisson regressions, use NLS. 
17 For sake of comparison we have also estimated the trade equation including importer and exporter 
dummies while using the corresponding RV trade cost function (eq. 16 in their paper) . The results   23
all specifications the distance coefficient is significant: the further apart two countries 
, the higher trade costs.  
 
Table 5  Trade costs functions and trade flows – PPML estimation 
Trade flows 
 Trade cost function:  RV   Hanson   multiplicative  additive 
distance -0.721  -0.0002  -0.712  -1.035 
   0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
internal distance  0.034  -0.001  0.050  -0.047 
   0.745 0.000 0.650  0.676 
contiguity 0.746    -  0.930  0.000 
   0.000   - 0.000  0.424 
common language   -   -  0.007  0.000 
    -   -  0.962  0.523 
landlocked importer   -   -  -0.441  0.000 
    -   -  0.045  0.295 
landlocked exporter   -   -  -0.257  0.000 
    -   -  0.003  0.513 
island importer   -   -  0.285  0.000 
    -   -  0.000  0.284 
island exporter   -   -  0.526  0.000 
    -   -  0.000  0.307 
ssa importer   -   -  -0.801  0.000 
    -   -  0.000  0.281 
ssa exporter   -   -  -1.052  0.000 
    -   -  0.000  0.635 
ssa importer and exporter   -   -  0.950  0.000 
    -   -  0.004  0.692 
gdp importer  0.751  0.743  0.733  1.070 
   0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
gdp exporter  0.851  0.838  0.841  0.976 
   0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
          
exporter dummies  no  no  No  no 
importer dummies  no  no  No  no 
own trade dummy  1.599  3.810  2.431  7.330 
   0.008 0.000 0.000  0.216 
           
(pseudo) R2  0.953  0.943  0.956  0.982 
nr. obs.  8774  8774  8774  8774 
           
importer = exporter?          
 - landlocked   -   -  0.386  0.455 
 - island   -   -  0.192  0.502 
 - ssa   -   -  0.275  0.343 
Notes: p-values underneath the coefficient; importer = exporter? shows the p-value of a test of equality 
of the importer and exporter variant of a certain country specific variable. 
                                                                                                                                            
were very similar to the results shown here when including importer and exporter gdp, also in terms of 
explanatory power (R
2) and in terms of the implication in the 2
nd step estimation on the effect of market 
access. Results available upon request. For sake of comparison we do show the results when estimating 
the wage equation using the 1st-step results for the RV trade cost function with trade dummies as an 
input in section 6.2.    24
 
Also sharing a common border (contiguity) significantly lowers trade costs 
(except in the additive specification), a finding consistent with earlier studies (e.g. 
Limao and Venables, 2001 and Redding and Venables, 2004). When estimating the 
multiplicative specification, the results show the importance of also considering 
country-specific trade cost proxies. Being landlocked or a Sub-Saharan African 
country raises trade costs, whereas being an island lowers these costs. These findings 
are very much in line with the results reported in Limao and Venables (2001) and 
show that these country-specific trade cost proxies cannot a priori be ignored. Things 
are rather different when considering the additive trade cost specification: except for 
distance no other variable is significant. We think that the increased non-linearity of 
the additive trade cost function is (at least partly) to blame for this. These estimation 
difficulties for the additive trade cost function are something to take explicit note of 
(we will return again to this issue when estimating the wage equation), and it limits in 
our view the usefulness of such a functional form. 
Of explicit interest here is the coefficient on internal distance (the coefficient 
shown reflects the difference of the internal distance coefficient with that of bilateral 
distance). When using the RV, the multiplicative or the additive specification we find 
no evidence that internal distance affects trade costs significantly different than 
bilateral distance does. Only when using the Hanson specification we find that 
internal distance affects trade costs significantly different from bilateral trade, the 
estimated coefficient suggests that internal distance increases trade costs to a much 
larger extent than bilateral distance does, which is contrary to what one would expect.  
 
6.1.2 Implied trade costs and trade cost functions 
Next we turn to the alternative way to infer trade costs from trade data, namely by 
calculating implied trade costs as shown by equation (17) in section 4. Doing this for 
our sample leaves us with no less than 3808 observed bilateral φij’s. How much of 
these implied trade costs can be accounted for by the four different trade cost 
functions used in the previous sub-section?  Or, to put it differently, does the use of 
implied trade costs provide a proxy for trade costs that differs from the proxy obtained 
using trade cost functions in Table 5? And what about the (ir)relevance of the 
underlying assumptions when calculating implied trade costs, see (18A,B)?   25
To answer the first question we regressed the bilateral φij’s on each of the four 
different trade cost functions introduced in the previous section.  
 
Table 6:  Trade cost functions and implied trade costs 
Implied trade costs (phi) 
 Trade cost function:  RV   Hanson  multiplicative  additive 
distance -0.854  -0.0002  -0.850  -1.352 
   0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
contiguity 0.707    -  0.8630  0.016 
   0.139   -  0.015  0.141 
common language   -   -  -0.226  0.001 
    -   -  0.152  0.425 
landlocked    -   -  -1.376  -0.030 
    -   -  0.000  0.013 
island    -   -  0.289  0.003 
    -   -  0.177  0.001 
ssa    -   -  -1.153  0.000 
    -   -  0.000  0.929 
ssa both   -   -  0.113  -0.002 
    -   -  0.767  0.307 
           
(pseudo) R2  0.113  0.058  0.145  0.221 
nr. obs.  3808  3808  3808  3808 
Notes: p-values underneath the coefficient. 
 
Table 6 shows the results that are again obtained using the PPML estimator to take 
account of the zeros in implied trade costs. Note that because of assumption (18B) we 
cannot split the country-specific trade cost proxies into an exporter and an importer 
part, so that each country-specific trade cost proxy enters only once.  
As can be readily seen from the (pseudo) R
2 for each of the four regressions, 
the trade cost functions capture at most 22% of the variation in implied trade costs. In 
case of the “Hanson” trade cost function this is only 5%! Apparently, approximating 
trade costs through implied trade costs differs quite a bit from obtaining these costs by 
estimating the parameters of an a priori specified distance function. Note also that the 
inclusion of country-specific trade cost proxies does improve the fit
18. The flexibility 
of implied trade costs (recall Table 3) as compared to the use of trade cost functions 
provides a useful alternative way to proxy trade costs in our view. 
  This last conclusion depends, however, crucially on the validity of the 2 
assumptions underlying the calculation of implied trade costs; see (18A,B). To shed 
                                                 
18 The inclusion of country dummies improves the fit even (results available upon request) further 
suggests that implied trade costs are capturing (unobserved) country-specific trade cost factors.   26
some light on the (ir)relevance of assumption (18B) the last three rows of Table 5 are 
instructive. As we mentioned before, when one believes that only symmetric bilateral 
trade cost proxies such as distance, contiguity and sharing a common official language 
matter, assumption (18B) is automatically satisfied. But we have been argueing that 
also country-specific proxies such as being landlocked are important to take into 
account. Allowing these proxies to have a different effect when engaging in import or 
export, as we have for example done in Table 5, implicitly violates (18B). This is so 
unless one cannot reject that the coefficients on the importer and exporter variant of a 
variables are the same. The results of performing such tests are shown in the last three 
rows of Table 5 and they provide an indication that indeed the assumption of 
symmetry as imposed by (18B) is not violated in case of the country-specific variables 
that we have included.  
The other assumption, no internal trade costs (18A), is probably a more 
problematic one. It seems likely that there are some trade costs involved with internal 
trade. The results in Table 5 all suggest that internal distance can serve as a sufficient 
proxy for own trade costs. Those results should however be taken with some care. The 
fact that the observations on own trade are heavily outnumbered by the observations 
on bilateral trade (by almost a factor of 10), could have its effect on the regression 
outcomes.  
 
Table 7  Trade cost functions and internal trade 
internal trade 
 Trade cost function: RV   Hanson   multiplicative additive 
distance  -0.195  -0.001 -0.176 -0.162 
    0.152  0.000 0.240 0.238 
landlocked    -   -  -0.025  -0.052 
    -   -  0.927  0.638 
island   -   -  -0.070  -0.024 
    -   -  0.836  0.848 
ssa    -   -  -0.256  -0.107 
    -   -  0.350  0.413 
gdp  importer  1.404  1.434 1.382 1.370 
    0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
           
(pseudo)  R2  0.879  0.886 0.880 0.874 
nr.  obs.  93  93 93 93 
Notes: p-values underneath the coefficient.   27
To check for this, we estimated each of the trade equations using only the data on 
internal trade. The results are shown in Table 7 above. 
Except in case of the Hanson distance function, none of the included trade cost 
proxies is found to be significant in explaining the variation in internal trade. In case 
of the country-specific variables this may not be that surprising (why should it matter 
for a country’s internal trade costs whether or not it is an island or landlocked?). What 
is most striking is that also internal distance, the widely used proxy for internal trade 
costs, mostly turns out to be insignificant (again except in the Hanson specification)
19. 
The results shown in Table 7 can, of course, not be taken as conclusive evidence that 
internal trade costs are indeed negligible and that assumption (18A) can therefore be 
taken for granted. They do, however, serve as an indication that the way internal trade 
costs are proxied when specifying them within the trade cost function approach, is 
also far from straightforward. Proxying internal trade costs by a clever transformation 
of a region’s or a country’s area, as is done by virtually all empirical NEG papers, 
may be just as harmful as assuming them away. 
 
6.2 Varying trade costs and the impact on market access  
We are now finally in a position to turn to our main point of interest, the way in which 
the various trade cost approximations may affect conclusions as to the relevance of 
real market access in determining gdp per capita levels in our sample. To this end, we 
estimate wage equation (7) using both the direct and the 2-step estimation strategies 
introduced in section 2, i.e. to refresh our memory:  
(1 )( 1)
12 3 ln ln ln
R
ii j j i j i
j
wGE G T
σσ α αα η
−− ⎛⎞
=+ + + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑    (7’) 
We focus on the size and significance of the parameter on market access (α3) when 
using the different trade cost proxies (this section) as well as when looking at the 
spatial reach of economic shocks (next section). For the direct estimation strategy as 
developed by Hanson (2005), we use NLS to estimate the parameters whereby we 
proxy Gi by a country’s price index and Ei by a country’s gdp level. When using the 
2-step estimation method as developed by Redding and Venables (2004), we construct 
                                                 
19 Considering that internal distance is merely capturing the area or the size of a country, this may 
indeed not be so surprising after all. Why should a larger country always face higher internal trade or 
transport costs (compare transportation within the USA against that of transportation within Sierra 
Leone)?   28
market access as specified in (10) on the basis of the results shown in Table 5 and 
estimate (7) by simple OLS, again proxying Gi by a country’s price index. We could 
have instead used more sophisticated GMM or 2SLS techniques that have been used 
in the empirical NEG literature and/or have proxied Gi by for example a constructed 
measure of supplier access. But we decided to use OLS and a simple proxy of Gi, to 
be able to focus entirely on the effect of the trade cost proxy used on the estimated 
effect of market access. The use of more sophisticated ways of estimating (7’) would 
make it far more difficult to ascribe different outcomes to the differences in the way 
trade costs are proxied. For the same reasons, we also assume that the technological 
differences between countries as measured by, ηi, can be adequately captured by a 
simple i.i.d. error term that is uncorrelated with the other regressors instead of also 
adding additional variables. 
  The results of the various estimations are shown in Table 8a. Each column 
gives first the estimation strategy used (2-step or direct) and below the trade cost 
approximation that was used, so RV-dum refers for instance to the Redding and 
Venables trade cost function with im- and exporter dummies and RV to the trade cost 
function (see Table 5) where gdp is used instead of the trade dummies. Similary, 2-
step/Hanson (column III in Table 8a) indicates a 2-step estimation of (7’) with the 
Hanson trade cost function.    
  






















α3  0.509  0.634  0.303 0.642 0.512  0.231 0.262 0.236  0.248 
  0.002  0.003  0.047 0.000 0.001  2.996 3.047 2.463  4.286 
a2  0.891  0.969  1.114 0.804 0.896  0.825 0.879 1.090  0.942 
  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  3.851 3.113 7.358  4.255 
               
R2  0.648  0.644  0.586 0.731 0.679  0.627 0.706 0.654  0.736 
nr  obs  80  80  80 80 80  80 80 80  80 
Notes: p-values underneath the coefficient in case of 2-step estimation. T-statistics underneath the 
coefficient in case of direct estimation. 
 
The first thing to note is that market access is always significant
20. But the size of the 
coefficient differs quite a bit across the trade cost proxies and the estimation 
strategies! The impact of a 1% increase in a region’s market potential on gdp per 
                                                 
20 Notwithstanding differences in the exact specifications used our estimation results for market access 
in Tables 8a and 8b are at least for the RV case (columns 1 and 2) similar to those in Redding and 
Venables (2004), see for instance their Table 3.    29
capita ranges from a minimum of 0.23% when using implied trade costs to 0.64% 
when using the multiplicative trade cost function. When comparing results for each 
estimation strategy separately, the differences are smaller but still the impact of a 1% 
change in market access ranges from 0.23% to 0.26% (0.30% to 0.64%) when using 
the direct (2-step) estimation strategy
21. Table 8b shows additional evidence on the 
impact of the type of trade cost proxy used. Here we abstracted from the thorny issue 
of internal trade costs and estimated the effect of only foreign market access (FMA), 
that is MA excluding a region’s own internal distance weighted gdp, on a region’s gdp 
per capita level. Hereby focussing more specifically on the way spatial interdepencies 
between countries matter for an individual country’s prosperity. 
 






















FMA 0.494  0.425  0.232 0.669 0.528  0.328 0.098 0.102  0.153 
 0.022  0.031  0.132  0.001  0.014  3.126 1.503 1.279  1.806 
a2  1.117 1.142 1.203  0.958  1.078 0.839 1.092 1.120  1.042 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  4.547 8.150 7.829  7.563 
                
R2 0.601  0.592  0.571  0.708  0.633  0.672 0.628 0.607  0.645 
nr obs  80  80  80  80  80  80 80 80  80 
Notes: p-values underneath the coefficient in case of 2-step estimation. T-statistics underneath the 
coefficient in case of direct estimation. 
 
As can be clearly seen from Table 8b the estimated impact of foreign market access 
differs much more than market access itself, a 1% increase in foreign market access 
raises gdp per capita from a mere 0.01% to 0.67% depending on the trade cost proxy 
used. This clearly indicates that the choice of trade costs specification makes quite a 
difference. Its impact is even estimated to be insignificant at the 5% level in 4 out of 8 
cases. The latter is especially the case for the direct estimation strategy when 
estimating the trade cost parameters jointly with the NEG parameters (columns 7-9)
22.
  On the basis of these estimation results we conclude that both the size and 
significance of (foreign) market access does depend on the type of trade cost 
                                                 
21 Note that the difference in size could also be due to the different ways in which market access is 
constructed. The thought experiment in the next section, which more explicitly describes the spatial 
reach of an income shock, implicitly shows, by calculating the marginal effects, that this is probably 
not the case. 
22 As mentioned already in the previous section, this probably is to a large extent due to the non-linear 
estimation process. The use of more elaborate trade cost functions makes it even ‘more non-linear’ 
increasing the difficulties with pinpointing the parameters.   30
approximation used. This is not the only way to illustrate why the empirical 
specification matters for NEG empirics. As trade costs are key to the strength of 
spatial interdependencies, the spatial or geographical reach of income shocks can 
potentially be very different when comparing different trade costs specifications. 
 
6.3   Trade costs and the spatial reach of an income shock in Belgium 
To address this issue we conduct the following thought experiment. Suppose that 
Belgium, a country in the heart of Europe, experiences a positive 5% gdp shock, to 
what extent will this shock, given our estimation results in Table 8, spill over to the 
other countries in our sample through the market access variable? The 5% increase in 
gdp increases the demand for goods from potentially all countries, however the actual 
magnitude of this increase in a specific country depends crucially on the strength of 
the spatial linkages and thus on the measurement of trade costs: i.e. the lower trade 
costs with Belgium, the larger the impact on a country’s gdp per capita. 
  Based on the estimation results from Table 8a and the various trade cost 
approximations, we have calculated the resulting gdp per capita changes as 
experienced by all other countries in response to the increased demand for their 
products from Belgium. Table 9 shows the correlation in gdp per capita effects for the 
different trade cost proxies and Figure 1 visualizes four of these correlations in some 
more detail.  
 






 - Han 
2step 
 - multipl. 
2step 
 - add 
Direct 









1  - - -  - -  - - 
2step  
– Han 
0.423  1 - -  - -  - - 
2step  
– multipl. 
0.983 0.490  1  -  -  -  -  - 
2step  
– add 
0.155 0.489  0.243  1  -  -  -  - 
direct  
– RV 
0.912  0.104a  0.880  0.068a  1 -  - - 
direct  
– Han  
0.825  0.422  0.825  0.149a  0.676 1  -  - 
direct  
– Multipl. 
0.887  0.031a  0.852  0.021a  0.992 0.655  1   
direct  
- φ 
0.834 0.489  0.817  0.102a  0.700 0.671  0.684  1 
Note: - a - means not significant at the 5% level 
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Notes: For the size of the correlations shown see Table 9. 
 
As can be seen from Table 9, the correlation between the gdp per capita differs 
markedly across the various different trade cost proxies. For some proxies the 
correlation is quite high (especially between the “RV” and the “multiplicative” trade 
cost function), but also in some cases the correlation is rather low or even 
insignificant. No systematic difference in correlations between estimation strategies 
used can either be detected. Figure 1 complements this finding by plotting the 
different gdp per capita changes for four different trade cost specifications (i.e. 
Redding Venables (RV, with gdp in the trade cost function), Hanson (HAN), the 
multiplicative trade costs function (MULTPL) and the implied trade costs (PHI)) 
against each other. It illustrates in more detail that the spatial impact of a localized 
gdp shock differs quite a bit across trade cost specifications.  
Figure 2 focusses explicitly on the spatial reach of the Belgian GDP shock. It 
plots the percentage gdp per capita change against log distance for the same four 
different trade cost approximations as shown in Figure 1: again the conclusions differ 
on the basis of the type of trade cost proxy used. 
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Notes: The correlation of the shock and ln distance are, going from upper left to lower right, -0.77, -
0.84, -0.67, -0.76 respectively. 
 
In for instance the Hanson case (upper right panel) the distance decay is very strong 
and also the size of the gdp per capita changes is relatively small. Take for instance 
the case of the Netherlands (NLD). In the Redding and Venables specifications (upper 
left and lower right panels), the gdp per capita change is about 7 times as large as in 
the Hanson case.
23 Figure 2 also shows that a more elaborate or heterogeneous trade 
costs specification (see the two lower panels) increases the variation of the gdp shock 
for countries at a similar distance to Belgium. Moreover this heterogeneity in 
differences in spatial reach corresponds predictively to the type of trade cost 
specification used.  
When using the Hanson (2005) exponential trade cost function that depends 
solely on distance, the size and spatial reach of the Belgian income shock also 
depends heavily on distance. The correlation between the shock and log distance is 
the largest in this case. Moreover due to the exponential distance function used, the 
effect of the income shock quickly peters out; there is no discernable effect any more 
                                                 
23 This seems to re-affirm the conclusion of Head and Mayer (2004, p. 2626) that the strong distance 
decay in Hanson (2005) “ may be a consequence of the functional form of the distance decay function”.  
See also Fingleton and McCann (2007).    33
in countries lying farther from Belgium than Egypt (in the RV specification Egypt still 
experiences a 0.1% increase in gdp per capita; this is about the size of the wage 
increase in the most heavily affected country, the Netherlands, when using the Hanson 
specification).  
The Redding and Venables (2004) specification also allows contiguity to have 
its effect on trade costs. Consequently the effect of the Belgian income shock, is less 
correlated with distance and has a larger effect on its contiguous neighbors. The shock 
now for example has a larger effect on Germany than on the closer (as measured by 
distance between capital cities) United Kingdom. Also the less extreme distance 
decay as implied by the estimated distance coefficient (compared to the exponential 
Hanson specification) ensures that the income shock peters out much slower and 
affects all countries in the sample in some way (Japan, with only a 0.02% increase in 
its gdp per capita, is affected the least).  
All countries are also affected when allowing also for country specific trade 
cost factors in the multiplicative trade cost function. However, the correlation of the 
income shock with distance decreases somewhat further. Moreover the estimated 
positive (negative) effect of being an island (landlocked or a Sub-Saharan African 
country), has a clear effect on the effect of the Belgian income shock. Landlocked 
Switserland, and Sub-Saharan Côte d’Ivoire are relatively much less affected by the 
income shock for example, whereas island nations such as Ireland, New Zealand 
experience a relatively larger gdp per capita increase. 
Finally when totally abstracting from the use of a trade cost function, by using 
implied trade costs, the effect of the Belgian income shock becomes even less 
correlated with distance. Given the way they are calculated the use of implied trade 
costs has the effect that countries that trade a lot with Belgium relative to the total 
amount of imports and exports between the two countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, 
Finland or Sweden, experience a relatively larger impact of the Belgian income shock 
than countries that do not export/import a substantial amount of their total trade to 
Belgium but to other countries (e.g. Germany or Great Britain). 
To sum up, from the evidence in Tables 8a,b and 9 as well as in and Figures 1 
and 2, we have to conclude that the way trade costs, a crucial elements of any NEG 
model, are approximated when doing empirical work has the potential to shape the 
overall conclusions about the empirical relevance of NEG and thus of the strength and 
the geographical reach of spatial interdependencies. The lesson for future NEG   34
research is therefore that topic of trade costs should be given much more attention. 
Also the robustness of the results to the use of a particular trade cost proxy warrants 
more explicit attention. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Trade costs are a crucial element of new economic geography (NEG) models, without 
trade costs geography does not matter. The size of trade costs crucially determines the 
relevance of market access and thereby of inter-regional spatial interdependencies. 
The unavailability of actual trade costs data hampers empirical research in NEG and it 
requires the approximation of trade costs. Notwithstanding the importance of trade 
costs in NEG models, most empirical NEG studies do not pay attention to the 
ramifications of the particular trade costs specification used. This paper shows, both 
theoretically and empirically, that the way trade costs are specified matters. 
Estimations of a NEG wage equation for a sample of 80 countries shows that the 
relevance of the key NEG variable, market access, and hence of spatial 
interdependencies hinges nontrivially upon the trade costs specification. Using three 
estimation strategies and various trade cost specifications, the main conclusion is that 
NEG needs to (re-)examine the sensitivity of its empirical findings to the handling of 
trade costs.      
New economic geography (NEG) is, of course, not the only theory around in 
spatial economics. But compared to urban and regional economics, NEG prides itself 
on the way it focuses on spatial interdependencies. These interdependencies come to 
the fore in the role market access and trade costs play in NEG whereas market access 
and trade costs are for instance typically neglected in urban economics (Combes, 
Duranton, and Overman, 2005, p. 320). Whether spatial interdependencies and hence 
market access and trade costs really matter is ultimately an empirical question. This 
paper argues that the answer to that, from an NEG perspective, crucial question can 
depend rather strongly on the empirical specification of trade costs. Future empirical 
research in NEG should therefore pay far more attention to the way trade costs are 
dealt with. Our paper provides a useful overview of the ex- and/or implicit 
assumptions made when approximating trade costs, hereby facilitating the choice of 
trade cost approximation when doing empirical work on NEG. 
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